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ELD-013

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-4215
___________
IN RE: GIDGET MOCK,
Petitioner
____________________________________

On Petition for a Writ of Mandamus from the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Related to D.C. Civil No. 06-cv-01722; 06-cv-01724; 07-cv-01605; 07-cv-02052)
District Judge: Honorable Petrese B. Tucker
____________________________________
Submitted pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
December 3, 2009
Before: BARRY, FISHER and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 19, 2010)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Petitioner Gidget Mock seeks a writ of mandamus directing the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to consolidate and remand several
cases to the United States Bankruptcy Court.
The procedural history underlying this petition is confusing at best. From what we
can discern, in March 2006 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania dismissed Mock’s bankruptcy petition and dismissed as moot a related
adversary proceeding. Additionally, Mock claims that, in April 2007, the Bankruptcy
Court denied her request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).
Mock’s Bankruptcy Court proceedings led to several appeals and causes of action
filed in the District Court. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 158 (stating that district courts have
jurisdiction to hear appeals from certain bankruptcy court judgments and orders). The
District Court, on July 16, 2007, issued an order under Civ. No. 06-cv-1722 consolidating
the following cases: Civ. Nos. 06-cv-1724, 07-cv-1605, and 07-cv-2052. Mock
continued to file additional causes of action and appeals and, on May 27, 2008, the
District Court issued an order under Civ. No. 07-cv-1605 (which had already been
consolidated under Civ. No. 06-1722) consolidating the following cases: Civ. Nos. 07cv-2052, 07-cv-2873, 07-cv-3269, 07-cv-4682, 07-cv-5557, and 08-cv-0183.1
Then, on October 10, 2008, the District Court issued an order in Civ. No. 07-cv1605: (1) dismissing Mock’s motion for reconsideration in Civ. No. 08-cv-0183 as moot;
(2) denying with prejudice Mock’s IFP motion in Civ. No. 07-cv-4682; and (3) denying
with prejudice Mock’s appeals under Civ. Nos. 07-cv-1605, 07-cv-2052, 07-cv-2873, 07cv-3269, and 07-cv-4682.2

1

The May 2008 order appears to have created two levels of consolidation, as,
although Civ. No. 07-cv-1605 had already been consolidated under Civ. No. 06-cv-1722,
the District Court then consolidated several additional cases under it.
2

We note that the District Court, on April 14, 2008, had denied Mock’s
applications for IFP in Civ. Nos. 08-cv-0183 and 07-cv-5557. Although the District
Court subsequently consolidated these cases under Civ. No. 07-cv-1605, it appears that it

In March 2009, Mock filed a Motion for Clarification under Civ. No. 07-cv-1622.
She sought information concerning the status of Civ. Nos. 06-cv-1722, 06-cv-1724, 07cv-1605, 07-cv-2052, 07-cv-5557, as well as a petition for writ of mandamus that she
purportedly filed in the District Court. On October 14, 2009, the District Court denied the
motion as moot.
Soon thereafter, Mock filed the current petition for a writ of mandamus. She
claims that the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court violated her due process rights by
denying of her applications for IFP status, asserts that the cases consolidated in July 2007
“remain dormant due to IFP issue,” and claims that the District Court’s October 14, 2009
order violated her due process rights. She requests that this Court order the District Court
to consolidate her cases and remand them to Bankruptcy Court for adjudication.

considered these cases closed due to its denial of Mock’s IFP applications—as the
October 10, 2008 order did not dismiss these cases. Mock appealed from the April 14,
2008 order denying her IFP application in Civ. No. 08-cv-0183. We summarily vacated
the order and remanded the case for further proceedings. See Mock v. Northampton
County, C.A. No. 08-2463, 316 F. App’x 86 (3d Cir. Mar. 12, 2009). The District Court
has yet to act on remand.
Additionally, as to Civ. Nos. 06-cv-1722 and 06-cv-1724, it appears that the
District Court also considers these cases closed. Nevertheless, in Mock’s appeal from the
District Court’s denial of her IFP application in Civ. No. 06-cv-1722, we stated that she
was not prejudiced by the denial of IFP because “despite the denial of the IFP application,
the case has seemingly proceeded in the District Court without impediment,” and as an
example of the ongoing nature of the case, noted that the District Court had “consolidated
with the instant case three separate bankruptcy appeals.” See In re Mock, C.A. No. 072891, 252 F. App’x 522, 524 (3d Cir. Nov. 1, 2007). Until Mock filed a motion for
clarification in March 2009, no activity had taken place in Civ. Nos. 06-cv-1722 or in 06cv-1724 since the July 2007 consolidation order. Although the District Court denied
Mock’s March 2009 motion as moot, the status of these cases remains unclear.

Mandamus is a drastic remedy available only in the most extraordinary situations.
In re Nwanze, 242 F.3d 521, 524 (3d Cir. 2001). As preconditions to the issuance of the
writ, the petitioner must establish that the writ will not be used as a substitute for the
regular appeals process, that there is no alternative remedy or other adequate means to
obtain the relief desired, and that the right to the relief sought is “clear and indisputable.”
Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976). Mock’s petition does not meet these
requirements.
First, a District Court has broad discretion to determine whether to consolidate
cases, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a); Investors Research Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 877 F.2d
777, 777 (9th Cir. 1989), and Mock has made no showing that the District Court has
abused its discretion by not consolidating all of her cases and appeals. Additionally, she
has not demonstrated a clear and indisputable right to a remand to Bankruptcy Court.
That her appeals to the District Court may have been decided adversely to her does not
mean that the decisions were improper or that she did not receive due process, as she
alleges. It appears that she merely seeks to circumvent the District Court’s dismissal of
several of her appeals and complaints by filing petition for a writ of mandamus rather
than appealing from these decisions. See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d
372, 379 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that mandamus cannot be used as a substitute for appeal).
We will deny the petition for writ of mandamus.

